PART 1 – THE PATH TO INVASION
Introduction
In recent weeks Russian foreign policy has been under intense scrutiny
due to the Russian attack of the 24th February 2022 on Ukraine. Essentially a dictatorship today, Russia
elected Vladimir Putin President, via a legitimate election, and he took
overall power 31st December 1999.
Since this time, he has consolidated his position at home and expanded
Russian influence over its neighbors following the chaos in Russian following
the fall of communism and the (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) USSR. He has employed the Russian armed forces in
several conflicts in and around its borders and these include, Chechnya 1999-2009,
Georgia 2008, Crimea 2014, Syria 2015.
Each of these campaigns has drawn criticism from the Western democracies
(The West), the UN and NATO but the latest (2022) attack on the Ukraine is
different. The scale of the Russian
armed forces committed to the attack and the reaction of Russia’s perceived
enemies has shaken the world. Talk of
World War 3 is commonplace, the refugee numbers leaving Ukraine is precedented
and the punitive economic sanctions taken against Russia by most of the
international community are likely to bring poverty to not only millions of
Russian citizens but across the world also.
Why? What can be done?
The “Why?” - Putin and NATO
President Vladimir Putin of Russia first took power (2000) in a very
different age. The unification of
Germany was less than 10 years earlier, democracy had supplanted communism in
Russia and the perceived military and ideological threat from Russia and the
Walsall Pact countries had seemingly been removed. The term “Peace Dividend” was coined heralding
a more prosperous global society resulting from a more stable world.
From
the first months of Putin’s premiership however, there were indications that
all was not well with Russia’s new leader regarding relations with NATO. In Russia’s first Foreign Policy Statement
approved by Putin just after he became President it was stated:
“….on a number of
parameters, NATO's present-day political and military guidelines do not
coincide with security interests of the Russian Federation and occasionally
directly contradict them. This primarily concerns the provisions of NATO's new
strategic concept, which do not exclude the conduct of use-of-force operations
outside of the zone of application of the Washington Treaty without the
sanction of the UN Security Council. Russia retains its negative attitude
towards the expansion of NATO.
Substantive and
constructive cooperation between Russia and NATO is only possible if it is
based on the foundation of a due respect for the interests of the sides and an
unconditional fulfilment of mutual obligations assumed.” (The Foreign Policy Concept of the
Russian Federation, 2000)
His
case is essentially this: In 1999,
Poland, Hungary joined NATO. In 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia joined NATO. All
of these countries were former, if not necessarily voluntary signatories of the
Warsall Pact – the Russian dominated grouping of then communist countries that
was effectively the antithesis of NATO.
The European balance of
power and the influence of Russia in Europe and indeed the world had changed. China was rising strongly as a world power. Militarily, Russia had less muscle and fewer
allies to defend the Russian motherland - the motherland that liberated these
lands from Nazi tyranny and lost tens of million lives doing so. The process of converting Russia from
communism to a mixed market economy was not complete. The promised land of the wealth of the west
spreading eastwards to Russia had not happened.
The average life expectancy in Russia in 2000 was 65.7 years. In the UK it was 77.74.
The Rise of Russia and
the EU Dependency on Russian Fossil Fuels
Good news was coming however,
and it cemented Putin’s popularity with the Russian people. Between 2000
and 2012 Russia's energy exports fuelled a rapid growth in living standards, with real disposable income rising by 160% (Rosstat. 2014).
With the middle east seemingly in constant turmoil, racked with
religious divides, proxy wars and the rise of the so-called Islamic State
Russian energy supplies were close to Europe and became ever more attractive. The re-unified Germany, the largest and most
economically powerful country in the EU, and its Russian speaking leader Angela
Merkel, had especially strong bonds with Russia and its energy reserves. With Russia no longer perceived as a threat
it became the obvious fossil fuel rich partner to drive European industry and
with it came Russian leverage and a growing concern in some of the western
capital cities.
The Weakening of NATO
In 2016 Donald Trump won the US
presidential election taking office as the 45th US president on the
20th January 2017. With the
slogan “Make America Great Again” he inferred the US was weakening as the one
remaining superpower and the countries focus should be on domestic renewal to
recover it superpower status and might. His
position on NATO was ambivalent. In
public he said just enough to support it.
In his May 25th 2017 speech at NATO Headquarters he said, and
with some truth, “The NATO of the future must include a great focus on
terrorism and immigration, as well as threats from Russia and on NATO’s eastern
and southern borders. These grave security concerns are the same reason that I
have been very, very direct with Secretary Stoltenberg and members of the
Alliance in saying that NATO members must finally contribute their fair share
and meet their financial obligations, for 23 of the 28 member nations are still
not paying what they should be paying and what they’re supposed to be paying
for their defense.
This is not fair to the people and taxpayers of the
United States. And many of these nations owe massive amounts of money from past
years and not paying in those past years. Over the last eight years, the United
States spent more on defense than all other NATO countries combined. If all
NATO members had spent just 2 percent of their GDP on defense last year, we
would have had another $119 billion for our collective defense and for the
financing of additional NATO reserves.” Remarks by
President Trump at NATO - U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Russia
(usembassy.gov), 2017
It was also noted that at the 2017 NATO speech he never
explicitly stated US commitment to Article 5 of the NATO charter. This is the re-bar core of NATO and requires
all signatories to fight if one of them is attacked. This omission was reported all over the world
and must have been very welcome in the Kremlin.
It was probably meant as a prod at Europe to increase its military
spending but it is the authors view, a European view, this was taken quite
differently in Moscow and Peking. A
naïve gaff in a troubled time.
Trump’s more private opinions were widely reported as
being much more forthright. Questioning the need for NATO, the validity of the
EU and other international organisations that to many represented the essence
of global stability. With social unrest
at home in the US growing, and not effectively countered by the US Federal
government, America appeared to be retreating from its accepted post WW2
position as the ultimate defence against instability and instead reinventing
itself as a more right-wing, Christian, Caucasian, isolationist country. The US attitude towards Russia also softened
with the attitude to China hardening. Trump’s
meetings with Putin also drew much controversy.
By this time Russia had made several armed interventions into other
sovereign countries and Trump appeared to accept these events.
Covid
On the 31st November 2019 the World Health
Organisation announced that an unknown disease was causing pneumonia like
symptoms in Wuhan, China and the Covid pandemic exploded across humanity. The world pivoted to deal with consequences
and ploughed a bottomless amount of resources into tackling the deadly
disease. A further distraction from
politics and another radical uncertainty was introduced to the world.
The world, in every way, was very different in 2022 when
compared to the almost naïve relative tranquillity of the millennium and its
global celebrations. World leaders
distracted, NATO weakened, Putin’s Russia wealthier, Russia a democracy in name
only, China set to eclipse the US as the world’s leading economy, pandemic,
Chinese and Russian armed forces exercising together and the US appearing to
roll back decades of one-nation building to prioritise the majority and ignore
the minority. The West was looking weak
and distracted. Putin viewed Ukraine as
a weak country, a shadow of Russia.
PART 2 – THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE
Opportunity Knocks
The stage was set.
The Russian grudge against the west has festered. Putin is unassailable and
emboldened by his military and political successes both at home and abroad. The EU is weakened by BREXIT losing its
strongest military power, the UK. The UK
in turn is adjusting to its new path and bickering with the EU. The EU is dependent on Russian fossil fuels then
the appearance of a seemingly unstoppable disease that is killing millions. In such a climate Putin feels he can take
more risks to warn the West and its military arm, NATO, that it is getting too
close. He believes the west is divided
and focused on other areas – it is soft and pre-occupied.
Russia attacked the Ukraine on the 24th
February 2022 on 3 fronts to remove western influence and negate the threat of
Ukraine joining NATO and bringing the perceived western military threat to
Russia’s western borders. It is also a
statement of a renewed Russia. A superpower
once more. A country to be feared and a
leader that demands to be respected.
Above all, a leader that demands to be respected and prepared to kill en
masse to reinforce the perception.
How Can the killing be Stopped?
Ukraine,
or something like, has been coming. Putin
is Russian foreign policy, Putin is Russia.
He is unassailable in his country and the driving force behind every one
of its domestic and overseas actions. It
is he and he alone that must be persuaded that there is another way for Russia,
and for him, to be recognized as important.
With thousands of deaths comes uncompromising hatred. A polarizing of views and a sense of
inevitability that the only outcome is an escalating one – strength and threat
– a “stop or else” mentality, a departure from the real cause. Hitler’s invasion of the Sudetenland in 1938
can be seen as the point of no return that led to the catastrophe of the
WW2. How does the world stop that
process repeating itself in 2022 thereby preventing WW3? The answer is a simple one; we talk. We unpick the entrenched views and buy time
for a working relationship to be agreed and create the necessary peaceful years
for that agreement to become strong, reliable, and eventually sacrosanct. We unpick the root causes and the
personalities and find a way to effect a change.
The
Barriers to Negotiation
Gifford
piece “Dragons of Inaction” (Gifford, 2020) may help here. In this work he breaks down the reasons why people
do not act even when they know they should, and it may be useful in the context
of the Russo-Ukrainian war and the ongoing distrust between Putin’s Russia and
the west. It may go a long way in
explaining why the west did not see the warning signs. Why the west belligerently continued a path
that fostered distrust even though the posture of Russia, always know as a very
real potential military threat to world peace, was allowed to grow its distrust
to the point where Putin felt assured enough to invade the Ukraine. Why Putin, failed to see the true strength of
the western allies that has halted the Russian offensive and will bring the
Russian economy and the people in it to the point, and maybe beyond, the point
of collapse.
Gifford
piece discusses climate change and breaks down the psychological reasons why,
in the presence of evidence of impending catastrophe, people can do little or
nothing to change course. War is different
than climate change but the reasons Gifford gives for this type of
intransigence may still be valid. Using
the Gifford lexicon, let’s start with Putin: Why has Putin risked a third world
war – what has he felt, what has he not felt?
Gifford’s alignment could include:
Limited
Cognition:
Ignorance. Putin
is a nationalist. He believes in the
greatness of Russia and in his lifetime has seen his country move from a World
War winning superpower to “merely” a heavily armed European country. He ignores that greatness can be achieved in
other ways. Might and power over
negotiation is his “fixed mindset” (Dweck, 2020) predisposition. He is ignorant of any other way other than using
the threat of aggression – it worked in the cold war, it will work again. He sees Russia’s involvement in its neighbors’
affairs as a historic right of Russia.
It is the Danegeld his neighbors must pay. A view ignorant of the fact that these neighbors
feel threatened and see NATO as protection against this influence. This in turn fuels Putin’s view that NATO is
an incredulous menace getting ever closer.
This cycle is a key driver of the Ukraine invasion.
Ideologies:
System Justification.
Putin see’s Russia’s time as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) as a golden age in Russian history.
Its autocracy and its power from building an armed forces capable of
overwhelming fascism in WW2 gave post war Russia superpower status. It needed to be considered in all strategic
world diplomatic actions. With the fall
of the USSR and the Walsall Pact Russia clearly regressed and Putin identifies
himself and Russia as needing to return to this paradigm.
Discredence:
Mistrust. Putin
does not trust the wests motives. He
sees the advance of NATO towards his borders as a security risk but also a
symptom of a lack of respect to him personally.
Various voices over the last 25 years have also stated that the West won
the cold war – that means the strongest Russian iteration of all, lost.
How
Do the West Fair when Analyzed using Giffords Model?
Ideologies:
Worldview. The
West views democracy and the free market as the only way to live. The population of the Western democracies
appear to support this view. Wealth and
freedom of speech and action are seen as prerequisites to any political
system. This is a very different view
than Putin and a concept not as reinforced with the Russian population as in
the West. The West, if it can sell this
concept to the Russian people, believes they will insist on a functioning
democracy that will reduce the propensity for nationalistic leaders – like
Putin. In effect, making Russia (say)
more like the West – one of a club led by the USA. This attitude is seen as a threat to national
identity and pride in countries such as Russia and China. Their culture is not the same as in the West
and, given their individual power, a culture that is not to the advantage of
non-democratic countries and their ruling elites.
System Justification.
In the 20th Century the democratic countries of the world out
produced and acquired more wealth than communist countries. Eventually this led to the fall of communism
as practiced in the USSR and an end to the cold war. This vindicated the West world view that if
every country was democratic and friendly the world population would be better
for it and the “people” want it.
Sunk
Cost:
Conflicting Values, Goals and Aspirations. Putin and the West have a radically different
idea of what the 21st century world order should look like. Putin mistrusts the values of the West and
thinks them self-serving and against his personal agenda of holding power. His personal corruption has been reported on
over the years so in addition to his security concerns there maybe a need to
keep power at all costs to avoid any later prosecution under a different
regime. Both influences are direct
opposites of the Wests’ values and social norms and drive the democracies to
doubt his real intentions in any given situation.
Can “The West” and Putin find Common Ground?
It is the opinion of the author that this is not possible. Mistrust is high and the hot war in the
Ukraine will only serve to polarize both principles in this escalating
conflict. Instead, the winning
negotiating formular will be one that leads to an agreement to disagree and
search for a more holistic solution as trust builds. This will require a “Growth Mindset” (Dweck,
2020). Here the “Not Yet” of Dweck
combined with the “not shooting” need to co-exist.
Putin’s and the West’s “Dragons” demand ladders. A step-by-step de-escalation of tension and
mistrust. Putin’s terms, after some
negotiation, would probably center around; the halt of the NATO advance westward;
re-instated into the G8 (as it would then be) as a major player that should be
listened to; the West would need to drop its war crimes accusations (arising
from the Ukraine invasion) and lift its sanctions. More controversially, Putin may insist on an
agreement that the independent states that Russia borders would fall under his
“sphere of influence” where his view takes sway over all others including the
states concerned – this for the West maybe a deal breaker.
The West, would need to trust a pledge from Putin to remain in his own
borders but my go along with a Russian common trading zone that includes his
border states. A political agreement
where Russian border states buy his fuels and take his imports in exchange for
peace and a preferential trading relationship.
Either way, the bordering states, many NATO members would need to agree
for the greater good of world peace, at this time.
The West would also need to give Russia and Putin respect on the world
stage. Putin resents the “loss” of the
cold war and wants dignity and for that he will need to leave the negotiating
table with something he can display to his own population. This is the key. He needs to justify the war in the Ukraine
and have something to say to his people “I am a great Russian leader, never
forget”.
The real problem for the West is history. The parallels with recent events and WW2 are
very real. Here Hitler was left to long
on his path and this made winning WW2 very costly indeed. The blunting of the Russian armed forces in
Ukraine and perhaps a weakening of Putin’s political position due to thousands
of body bags from a botched invasion maybe too seductive to the West. They risk however not learning from the
Japanese entry in WW2 where the US oil embargo made Japan more likely to fight
than not given its political leadership at the time.
I think the Russo-Ukrainian war will stop short of causing WW3. Putin is a survivor and the West know they
can destroy Russian both militarily and economically if it wishes to take the consequences. The West to date has unified and shows a
fighting spirit that may have surprised Putin.
The Ukrainians certainly have and the losses on the Russian side are
likely to be heavy. Heavy losses and
victory spoils that will be difficult to justify to history may well make Putin
listen a little closer to the West.
Likewise, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia may well make the
West listen a little closer to Putin.
This is where Giffords “Dragons” can be slain by using the “Growth
mindset” of Dweck. Without a cessation
of hostilities, there is a risk that war will develop its own momentum and make
it’s own decisions. These deciding
factors could be a very long away from the reasons why the war started in the
first place whilst the bodies stack up.
Finally, The People of Ukraine
Ukraine could well be the sacrifice needed to avert a third World
War. There country will be re-built, but
they will always have the West on one side and Russia on the other. Their bravery and sacrifice however will be
noted by history. Ukraine has forged its
own identity with the blood of its people fighting an invasion caused by
someone else. If, in the decades to
come, normal relations between the West and Russia are achieved, this will be
Ukraine’s salvation from its terrible geographical dilemma. Here, free from proxy hot and cold wars, is
where the brave people of this country will find free nationhood, peace and
prosperity once again. It looks a
far-off prospect, but history will demand it and future generations must grant
it.
S P RATTLEY
Citations:
1.
THE FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(2000, June 28). Nuclear Forces Guide. Retrieved March 7, 2022, from https://nuke.fas.org/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm
2.
(ДИНАМИКА РЕАЛЬНЫХ ДОХОДОВ НАСЕЛЕНИЯ (in
Russian). Rosstat. Wikipedia Retrieved 21 July 2014.
Retrieved by this author 7th March 2022) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Russia
3.
Remarks by
President Trump at NATO - U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Russia
(usembassy.gov) 2017
4.
Gifford, Robert, “The Dragons of Inaction:
Psychological Barriers That Limit Climate Change Mitigation and Adaption” Inquiry
to Academic Writing: A text and Reader, 5th Edition: page 686:
Ebook) 2020
5.
Dweck, Carol
(“From Mindset – The New Psychology of Success” Inquiry
to Academic Writing: A Text and Reader, 5th Edition: page 669: Ebook) 2020
